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IN RE MARRIAGE OF CAREY:
THE END OF THE PUTATIVE-MERETRICIOUS SPOUSE
DISTINCTION IN CALIFORNIA
INTRODUCTION
California's Family Law Act' defines marriage as follows:
Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract, to
which the consent of the parties capable of making that contract
is necessary. Consent alone will not constitute marriage; it must
be followed by the issuance of a license and solemnization as
authorized by this code, except as provided by Section 4213.2
In cases where the parties to a "marriage" have failed to satisfy
the statute, the courts have adopted the civil law theory of the
putative marriage.
The essential basis of a putative marriage is a belief in the ex-
istence of a valid marriage. Thus some courts define a putative
spouse as one who in "good faith believes he or she is married."3
Other courts expand this definition to include a requirement of an
objective indication of this good faith; a marriage sufficient in form.
These courts define a putative spouse as one party to "a matrimo-
nial union which has been solemnized in due form and celebrated
in good faith ... but which by reason of some legal infirmity is
either void or voidable. ' 4 In any event, it is the belief of the parties,
not their capabilities to enter a valid marriage, that is determina-
tive. In the usual situation, the "good faith" requirement is satis-
fied if there is an attempt to comply with the marriage regulations.5
The extent of the attempt may vary with the education, intelligence
and experience of the one claiming putative status.6 No case has
1. CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1970).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1970).
3. Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 675, 118 P. 441, 443 (1911); See also Laz-
zarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal- App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948).
4. In re Estate of Foy, 109 Cal. App. 2d 329, 331, 240 P.2d 685, 686 (1952);
In re Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 768, 189 P.2d 741, 742 (1948);
CLAnx, LAW or DOM STIC RnrA.roxs 54 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Clark].
5. Miller v. Johnson, 214 CaL App. 2d 123, 29 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1963).
6. See Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank, 213 Cal. 664, 3 P.2d 307 (1931);
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been found where the putative spouse status rested solely on the
belief in common law marriage in California.7
On the other hand a meretricious spouse, one who cohabits with
another knowing that the relation is illicit,8 is not entitled, in the
absence of agreement, to a share in the accumulated property.9 The
parties in effect will be left where they are found.10
Until the Family Law Act, effective January 1, 1970, there was
no statutory provision for the disposition of property accumulated
during a void" or voidable12 marriage. The statutes governing the
characterization of the accumulated property as community pro-
perty'3 and its subsequent distribution upon divorce' were predi-
cated on the existence of a valid legal marriage. If the parties failed
to fulfill the requirements for marriage, or if the marriage was void
or voidable, there was no community property to be distributed. In
the typical situation this would leave an unemployed spouse with
no rights to the marital property, despite the fact that he or she
may have entered the marriage believing it to be valid and free
from any impediments. To help remedy this situation, the courts
have implemented the putative spouse theory.
If one or both of the parties to a void or voidable marriage were
putative, the courts would resort to one of several theories to permit
an equitable division of the property accumulated during the
marriage. Some would "look to the statutes dealing with divorces,
annulment or separate maintenance ... as furnishing a standard
Santos v. Santos, 32 Cal. App. 2d 62, 89 P.2d 164 (1939).
7. But ef. Sancha v. Arnold, 114 Cal. App. 2d 772, 251 P.2d 67 (1952)
(a good faith belief that the party or parties, as residents of a state recogniz-
ing common law marriages, fulfilled the requirements for such a marriage,
will support a finding of a putative spouse status in California).
8. Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962);
Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
9. Id.
10. Oakley v. Oakley, 82 Cal. App. 2d 188, 185 P.2d 848 (1947).
11. An incestuous or knowingly bigamous marriage is void from the be-
ginning. CAL. Civ. CoDE §§ 4400-4401 (West 1970).
12. A marriage in which one or both of the parties were under the age
of consent, or where consent was obtained by fraud or force, or where either
party was of unsound mind, or was physically incapable of entering into
marriage, or was guilty of innocent bigamy is voidable. A voidable mar-
riage is valid until adjudged a nullity. CAL. Civ. CoD § 4425 (West 1970).
13. CAL. Crv. CoDE §§ 4803, 5107-5111 (West 1970).
14. CAL. Civ. CoD § 4800 (West 1970).
to be used by way of analogy."1u The theory of partnership or
quasi-partnership might be referred to,16 or simply the inherent
equitable powers of the court to protect the innocent party.1 7 In
any case the result was not unlike that which would have resulted
had the marriage been valid.
The Family Law Act gave statutory recognition to the property
rights of a putative spouse. Section 4452 defines a putative spouse
and the property to which this spouse has an interest.'8 It further
provides that this "quasi-marital" property shall be divided in
accordance with section 4800 which is the section on division of com-
munity and quasi-community property upon divorce.' 9 Until In re
Marriage of Carey20 this was generally presumed to have merely
codified existing case law on the subject.
IN RE MARRIAGE OF CAREY
Paul Carey and Janet Forbes lived together for eight years during
which time they had four children. Although they never married,
they held themselves out as a married couple, transacted all busi-
ness as husband and wife, and Paul at all times recognized the
children as his own. Paul worked to support the family while Janet
generally stayed at home to care for the home and children. Each
spoke at one time or another of a marriage ceremony but no steps
were ever taken in this direction.21 In 1971, Paul filed a petition
under the Family Law statutes asking the court to find a nullity
as to any purported marriage. 22
The narrow issue presented to the court was whether an attempt
15. Turknette v. Turknette, 100 Cal. App. 2d 271, 274, 223 P.2d 495, 498
(1950).
16. Sousa v. Freitas, 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 666, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485, 489
(1970).
17. Brown v. Brown, 274 Cal. App. 2d 178, 79 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1969); Cald-
well v. Odisio, 142 Cal. App. 2d 732, 299 P.2d 14 (1956).
18. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4452 (West 1974):
Whenever a determination is made that a marriage is void or void-
able and the court finds that either party or both parties believed
in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall declare
such party or parties to have the status of a putative srouse, and,
if the division of property is in issue, shall divide, in accordance
with Section 4800, that property acquired during the union which
would have been community pro-erty or quasi-community prop-
erty if the union had not been void or voidable. Such property
shall be termed 'quasi-marital property'. If the court expressly re-
serves jurisdiction, it may make the property division at a time
subsequent to the judgment.
19. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800 (West 1970).
20. 34 Cal. App. 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
21. Id.
22. Brief for Appellant at 1,
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at solemnization was necessary for one to qualify as a putative
spouse or whether a belief that a "common law" marriage was valid
was sufficient.23 The court, however, felt the "principle issue" con-
cerned the Family Law Act "which provides among other things
that the concept of individual 'fault' or 'guilt' or 'punishment' for
such human error, shall not be considered in determining family
property rights."24 Although never articulated as such the court
seemed to address the question of whether or not the putative-
meretricious spouse distinction was consistent with the Family Law
Act. In other words, instead of addressing the question, "What is
a putative spouse?" the court asked "Is the putative spouse theory
consistent with the "no fault" concept expressed in the Family Law
Act?"
After reviewing the community property theory, especially that
applicable to the putative and meretricious spouses, the court ex-
amined the Family Law Act. It found the most significant change
in the law to be the elimination of fault or guilt in the division
of community property upon divorce. This concept might also
apply to a declaration of a judgment of nullity of a void or voidable
marriage. However, in examining the section which makes the
23. The trial court found that there was no legal marriage, but ruled that
the property accumulated during the marriage was quasi-community prop-
erty and accordingly awarded Janet a one half share. Paul appealed this
determination of the status of the property.
The issue framed by the briefs presented the appellate court with the
question of whether Janet could be classified as a putative spouse. Paul
argued that section 4452 contemplated at least an attempted compliance
with the requirements of marriage and that no such attempt had been made
in this case. Brief for Appellant at 9. He also pointed out that the court
in its memorandum decision at no time referred to Janet as a putative
spouse and made no findings of fact on this point. Brief for Appellant at
10. Paul argued that since Janet failed to qualify under section 4452 as
a putative spouse, she acquired no right, by mere cohabitation alone, to the
property accumulated during their relationship.
Janet proceeded on the theory that she was in fact a putative spouse.
Janet had testified that she believed that "common law" marriages were
valid. This belief was "apparently shared by petitioner... since he signed
a declaration under penalty of perjury prepared by his counsel." Brief for
Respondent at 3. She also argued that their conduct during the marriage
was consistent with the belief that they were married. Brief for Respond-
ent at 3. Since section 4452 does not mention an attempt at solemnization,
the findings of fact were not inconsistent with a good faith belief by both
parties that there was a marriage; therefore, the property should be divided
as community property. Brief for Respondent at 3.
24. Carey, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 347, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
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latter provison, the court discovered a discrepancy. The application
of this section is conditioned upon a finding that "either party or
both parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid.125
The court found that where only one party had the requisite good
faith the "guilty" party had not been penalized.20 Therefore, to
maintain that where both parties were equally guilty, they shall
be left where found by the court, would be to "infer an inconsistent
legislative intent."27 To avoid this inconsistency the court held that
the legislative declaration of a "no fault" policy was paramount and
"supersedes contrary pre-1970 judicial authority.128 This, in effect,
meant ignoring section 4452 of the Family Law Act. Left with the
problem of when the community property theory applies to a void
or voidable marriage, the court rather summarily established a
criterion similar to a common law marriage:
[A]n ostensible marital relationship... with cohabitation and
mutual recognition and assumption of the usual rights, duties, and
obligations attending marriage.29
Thus, to replace the putative spouse doctrine the court supplied
a new definition; of marriage-at least for purposes of dividing
"community property" upon the termination of a marriage. Since
the court buttressed this conclusion on the legislative intent as ex-
pressed in the Family Law Act, it is necessary to examine the Act
to ascertain if it sustains this conclusion.
THE F nLY LAW ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The Family Law Act had its origins in the Governor's Commission
on the Family. Prompted by a recognition that "our present social
and legal procedures for dealing with divorce are no longer ade-
quate,"30 Governor Brown directed the commission in May 1966 to
"begin a concerted assault on the high incidence of divorce in our
society and its often tragic consequences." 3' Among other things,
the Governor specifically requested that the commission suggest re-
visions of California's family law statutes, to study the feasibility
of establishing Family Courts and to suggest the most effective way
such courts could operate.32 The commission's report, issued in
25. CAL. Cnv. CoDm § 4452 (West 1970).




30. Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown to the Governor's Commis-
sion on the Family, May 11, 1966.
31. Id.
32. ASSEMBLY CoivmV. REPORT ON ASSEmBLY BmLL No. 530 & SENATE BILL
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December 1966, limited itself to these requests.
The Governor's Commission postulated that the goal of every dis-
solution proceeding should be to effect a reconciliation if possible.
This could only be accomplished if there was an- in-depth study of
the marriage to determine the reasons for its apparent breakdown.
Such a realistic appraisal of the marriage was quite impossible, the
commission reasoned, under the existing divorce procedure.
Former Civil Code section 92 contained seven grounds for di-
vorce: adultery, extreme cruelty, willful desertion, willful neglect,
habitual intemperance, conviction of a felony and incurable in-
sanity.33 These had to be "proven!' in the normal adversary set-
ting. 4 Furthermore, when a divorce decree was based on adultery,
incurable insanity, or extreme cruelty, the trial court was required
to award more than fifty percent of the community property to
the innocent party. 5  The result was usually one of two equally
undesirable situations."0 At one extreme was the sharply adver-
sary proceeding with each party endeavoring to prove the "guilt"
of the other, thereby adding to the emotional trauma of all involved.
In their enthusiasm, the parties would not infrequently resort to
"questionable methods of gathering effective but lurid and ludi-
crous testimony."3 7 At the other extreme were the "sham proce-
dures" which merely reflected the unrealistic nature of a "fault"
centered proceeding.
The commission's solution to this antagonism between a fault
based divorce and a realistic appraisal of the marriage with a view
towards reconciliation was as follows:
We recommend that the existing fault grounds of divorce and the
concept of technical fault as determinant in the division of com-
munity property, support and alimony be eliminated, and that
marital dissolution be permitted only upon a finding that the mar-
riage has irreparably failed after a penetrating scrutiny and after
No. 252 in 1969 JoURNm'AL OF TaE CAwrolNIA ASSEMBLY 8053, 8054 [hereinaf-
ter cited as ASSEMBLY REPORT].
33. CAL. Civ. CODE § 92 (West 1954).
34. CAL. CIV. CODE § 130 (West 1954).
35. CAL. Civ. CODE § 146 (a) (West 1970); See ATOmEY's GUIDE TO FAM-
ILY LAW AcT PRAcTICE § 5.7 (2d ed. California Continuing Education of the
Bar 1972) [hereinafter cited as A romEay's GUIDE].
36. AssEmBLY PEPonT at 8056-8057; 23 AssEwaLY Irma: CoinwsIaTEE RE-
PORT, FnAL REPORT or TE ASSEmBLY INTERim CoImv=rrraE ON TEE JUDIcIARY,
RELATnG TO DomESTic RELATIoNs, 62-63 (1965).
37. ASSEMBLY RPnORT at 8057.
the parties have been given by the judicial process every resource
in aid of reconciliation. 38
Acting on this advice, the legislature reduced the grounds of divorce
from seven to two: "irreconciliable differences" and "incurable in-
sanity," both of which were to be pleaded generally.8 9 Of even
greater significance was section 4800 which eliminates fault as a
basis for dividing property, requiring the court to divide the com-
munity property and the quasi-community property of the parties
equally.40
What becomes apparent then, even from a cursory investigation,
is that the Governor's Commission, and subsequently the legis-
lature, were concerned almost exclusively with divorce or dissolu-
tion. The fault or guilt with which they were concerned was that
which occurred during the marriage. A dissolution necessarily
presumes the existence of a valid marriage. As to the division of
community property, the Act again reflects an interest in this area
only to the degree that it involves a dissolution. There was no
change in the substantive law requiring the existence of a valid
marriage. 41 In short, the Governor's Commission and the legisla-
ture premised their work on the existence of a marriage. Their
concept of "no fault" was strictly limited to conduct occurring
during marriage. To the degree therefore, that the court based its
rule of no fault for conduct occurring prior to or contemporeaneous
with the marriage, on "the general tenor and scope of the entire
scheme," it is without support.
SECTION 4452: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A study of the legislative history of section 4452 also fails to sup-
port the belief that the legislature intended to expand the no-fault
concept to void and voidable marriages. In fact, it is reasonable
to infer that the legislature intended just the opposite: the creation
of a fault standard. This can be illustrated by comparing some
of the commission's suggestions with what the legislature actually
passed. A comparison of the new sections 4400 and 4401 with the
old Civil Code sections 59 and 61 and section 4425 with Civil Code
section 82 evidences no change in the grounds for declaring a
marriage void or voidable. 42 A further comparison of the two stat-
utes indicates that aside from section 4452 (Putative Marriage-
38. REPORT OF THE GOvERNOR'S COMIUSSION ON THE FAMILY at 1-2 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT].
39. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West 1970).
40. CAL. CODE § 4800 (West 1970).
41. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1970).
42. See ATToNEY's GUIDE § 3.33.
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Division of Property) and two other sections not applicable to this
discussion, 43 the entire treatment of void and voidable marriages,
except for nomenclature, is substantially the same. Instead of an
"annulment," the Family Law Act substituted the "judgment of
nullity."44
The Governor's Commission, however, had suggested something
radically different. They were prepared to extend the no-fault
concept to conduct occurring prior to marriage at least with regard
to voidable marriages. The commission reasoned that since a void-
able marriage is good until annulled, the problems presented by
a request for an annulment of such a marriage were no different
than those presented by dissolution. If the parties could live to-
gether as a married couple there was no need for an annulment.
If they could not, a dissolution was in order.45  Accordingly, the
commission recommended
the elimination of the specific fault annulment grounds; the
removal of the annulment of voidable marriages as a separate form
of action; and the coalescence of all dissolution proceedings (save
for declarations of nullity in the case of void marriages) into a
single form of action governed by a single standard.46
The legislature declined to accept the "no fault" voidable mar-
riage concept, however. Their reasons were threefold: (1) the leg-
islature felt that "it was not certain" that the grounds for annul-
ment would be included under the "irreconcilable differences" test;
(2) an annulment might be less offensive to some than a dissolu-
tion; and (3) an annulment relates back.4 7
As to the first reason, the legislature could be quite certain that
the grounds for annulment would not be included under the "ir-
reconcilable differences" test.4 8 But this avoids the thrust of the
no-fault divorce theory "making the possibility of reconciliation the
important issue.149 The legislature seems to be indicating that al-
though fault during the marriage will not be considered, fault
43. CAL. CMv. CODE §§ 4454-4455 (West 1970).
44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4425 (West 1970).
45. REPORT at 35-37.
46. Id. at 36.
47. AssEBaLY REPORT at 8060.
48. Compare notes 11-12 (grounds for annulment) with CAL. CrV. CODE§ 4507 (West 1970).
49. ASSEMBLY REPORT at 8058.
before the marriage will be considered and is, of itself, enough to
terminate the relationship.
The second and third reasons given seem to be directed, in part,
at the religious differences between a judgment of nullity and a
divorce. Those with religious scruples against remarriage after a
divorce do not have this problem upon a judgment of nullity
-because there never was a marriage.
It has also been suggested that the ab initio aspect of a judgment
of nullity allows the parties a certain degree of vindication from
the element of failure associated with a broken marriage. It is not
that the parties failed in this relationship but that there never was
a relationship. 50 If this was the legislature's intention, it further
illustrates their concern with "fault" in void or voidable marriages.
Under section 4452 the lack of knowledge of the impediment
makes the putative spouse's conduct less opprobrious. That a party
was responsible for the defective condition of the marriage is im-
material. For example, if the marriage is voidable because of the
"innocent bigamy" 51 of one party, such party would be the cause
of the annulment and thus the one at fault. The other spouse
would be the innocent victim even if he or she was aware of the
impediment. Section 4452, however, reverses the roles and furnishes
the party causing the annulment with the vindicating element of
a putative spouse status while the party with knowledge of the
situation 'becomes the guilty one. Thus, what provides the element
of exoneration in section 4452 is not the same mitigating element
available without this section. The legislature is providing less
stigma to the party who has no knowledge of the impediment.
SEcTIox 4452
The reason the court turned to an examination of the general
legislative intent was that it found section 4452 to be internally
inconsistent. The court believed:
[T]hat where one party to a nonmarital family relationship in bad
faith knew of the marriage's infirmity or nonexistence, and the
other did not, the Act neither penalizes nor rewards the respective
parties upon a judicial division of the accumlated property. The
party who in bad faith brought about the pseudo marriage is not,
for that reason, left where found by the court .... A person who
by deceit leads another to believe a valid marriage exists between
them shall be legally guaranteed half of the property they acquired
50. Comment, Dissolution and Voidable Marriage Under the California
Family Law Act, 4 LOYOLA L.A. L. Rzv. 331, 336 (1971).
51. CAL. Civ. COD. § 4401 (West 1970).
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even though most, or all, may have resulted from the earnings of
the blameless partner.5 2
If this section functioned in the manner suggested by the Carey
court, it would indeed embody "inconsistent provisions on the same
subject". However, an examination of the statute itself, as well
as the case history which it codifies, reveals that the court misinter-
preted the application of section 4452.
An understanding of the workings of section 4452 may be had
,by examining the pre-Family Law case law on the subject of a puta-
tive spouse. The Commission felt that their recommended statute
for void marriages, 53 which is virtually identical to section 4451,
"essentially codifies existing case law".5 4 The commentators in
general have also treated it as such.55
The case law on meretricious spouses unequivocally states that
a meretricious spouse is to be left where found by the court,56 and
he or she does not, by reason of such cohabitation, attain an interest
in the property. 57  That the "guilty spouse" is not "punished"
but instead "legally guaranteed half of the property" is only
because of the usual posture of the parties. In the situation normally
presented to the court, the husband has been the wage-earner and
thus has all the property. If the wife is a putative spouse, she will be
awarded a one-half interest in the property, leaving the husband
with the other half.55 If she is not a putative spouse, he may retain
all the property. The husbaid's status in this situation is imma-
terial as far as the division of the accumulated property is con-
52. Carey, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 352, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865-67; Report at 75.
53. Section 014b. Whenever a determination is made under this
Chapter that a marriage is void or otherwise invalid and the court
finds that either party or parties to the union believed in good faith
that the marriage was valid, the court shall declare such party or
parties to have the status of a putative spouse, and thereupon may
divide equitably, by analogy to the laws respecting community
property, that property acquired during the union which would
have been community property or quasi-community property if the
union had been legally valid. Such property shall be termed
'quasi-marital property'.
54. REPORT at 75.
55. LuTvH & LuTHEm , Support and Property Rights of the Putative
Spouse, 24 IRJSTMGs L.J. 311, 317 (1973); ATTORs GUmEs at 272.
56. Oakley v. Oakley, 82 Cal. App. 2d 188, 185 P.2d 848 (1947).
57. Flanagan v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 213 Cal. 664 3 P.2d 307 (1931).
58. Sancha v. Arnold, 114 Cal. App. 2d 772, 251 P.2d 67 (1952).
cerned5" and thus, obviously, he is not penalized for his bad faith.
However, the fact that he will, in either case, be awarded at least
one-half of the property should not be interpreted as a "legal guar-
antee" of the same. This can be illustrated by viewing the situation
from the wife's or non-wage earning spouse's side. The property
is all in her husband's name and she therefore has none. The only
circumstance under which she will be "legally guaranteed" half of
the property is if she is found to be a putative spouse. Otherwise
the court will leave her where found-with nothing.60  Contrary
to what the court said, "a person who by deceit leads another to
believe a valid marriage exists," is not, "legally guaranteed half of
the property."
The confusion seems to stem from an attempt to apply a guilt-
punishment, innocent-reward analogy. Such an analogy is inappli-
cable because normally only one spouse, the wage-earner, has some-
thing to lose, and only the non-wage earning spouse has something
to gain. Thus, the guilt or innocence of the party with the property
is always immaterial. The distribution of the property depends
solely on the status of the nonpropertied spouse. The putative
spouse, however, is always awarded at least a one-half interest in
the property. The non-putative spouse either is left where found
by the court, or loses a one-half interest in the property.
An analysis of section 4452 discloses that it is in fact consistent
with the case law. By limiting its application to the situation where
"either party or both parties" are in good faith, the section codifies
the above theory of a property right to the putative spouse. It
does not purport to award a property right to the non-putative
spouse, as the court suggests. To interpret the section otherwise
would be to make the state a party to the unjust enrichment of
a meretricious spouse.61 This interpretation is further bolstered,
by the legislature's limitation on the application of this section.
The quasi-marital property must be divided only "if the division
of property is in issue". 2 The putative spouse would only put the
property in issue if he or she did not already have it. The non-
putative spouse presumably would not be allowed to raise the issue
having failed to qualify under the statute.
CoMMoN LAW MARRIAGE
Upon finding section 4452 inconsistent both internally and with
59. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 214 Cal. App. 2d 123, 29 Cal. Rptr. 251
(1963).
60. Miller v. Johnson, 214 Cal. App. 2d 123, 29 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1963).
61. Comment, Dissolution and Voidable Marriage Under the California
Family Law Act, 4 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 331, 336 (1971).
62. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4452 (West 1970).
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the general legislative intent of "no fault", the Carey court disre-
garded it entirely. With no explanation as to how it came to this
conclusion, the court confidently states:
The Family Law Act obviously requires that there be established
.an actual family relationship with cohabitation and mutual as-
sumption of the usual rights, duties, and obligations attending mar-
riage.0 3
The family relationship defined by the court is descriptive of the
traditional common law marriage. Common law marriage has two
requirements: the mutual expression of the parties of a present
consent to marry, and the mutual assumption of the marriage rela-
tion. 64 Evidentiary rules have generally replaced the substantive
ones, however, so that an agreement will generally be inferred from
the fact that the parties hold themselves out as a married couple
even in cases where the evidence indicates there was no such agree-
ment.65 The court's definition of marriage clearly incorporates the
evidentiary requirements for a common law marriage. However,
neither the Family Law Act, nor the case law, supports a finding
of common law marriages in California.
Section 4100 of the Act, entitled "Requirements for Marriage,"
is identical with the section that has been in existence since 1895.06
It specifically states that "consent alone will not constitute mar-
riage; it must be followed by the issuance of a license and solemni-
zation as authorized by this code .... -67 This section has been
uniformly interpreted as being not just directory but mandatory,
thereby precluding common law marriages in California. 8 Such
an interpretation is based partly on section 4200, entitled "Require-
ments for Authentication of Marriage," which provides that "non-
compliance with its provisions by others than a party to a marriage
does not invalidate it."' 9 This has been held to imply that non-
compliance by parties would invalidate the marriage. 70
63. Carey, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 354, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
64. U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Britton, 269 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir.
1959); CLARK at 47.
65. CLARK at 49.
66. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1970), formerly § 55 (1895).
67. Id.
68. 6 WiTrEN, SUmmTARY OF CALuOmqiA LAw § 20 (8th ed. 1974) (empha-
sis added) [hereinafter cited as WiTKIN].
69. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4200 (West 1970) (emphasis added).
70. Norman v. Thomson, 121 Cal. 621 (1898).
Whether the court intended this definition of marriage to apply
only to the distribution of property accurnlated during a void or
voidable marriage or in all situations is not specifically stated.
In either case, the use of a common law marriage is without support.
As to the requirements of marriage in general, the Act makes no
substantive changes at all. As to the distribution of accumulated
property of a void or voidable marriages in particular, neither the
general tenor nor the specific statutory changes indicate that any-
thing less than a valid marriage or a good faith belief that such
a marriage exists will suffice.
CoMUNIT PRoPERTY THEoRY
The court in Carey is not alone in chafing against the result re-
quired by the application of the traditional rules regarding mere-
tricious marriages. The dissents in several landmark cases on the
subject have expressed their displeasure with the results.7 1 Justice
Curtis, in his dissenting opinion in Vallera v. Vallera, summed up
the general feeling as follows:
Just because the man, who in the instant case was equally guilty,
earned the money to buy the property, should not bar the woman
from any rights at all in the property although her services made
the acquisition possible. Such a rule gives all the advantages to
be gained from such a relationship to the man with no burden.72
The result, Justice Curtis continued, is unreasonable "[unless the
underlying purpose be to punish the woman for participating in
the illicit relationship .... -73
Aside from the fact that the rule regarding meretricious relation-
ships punishes only the non-wage earner, and rewards only the
employed spouse, the rule is also open to the criticism that it ignores
the relationship of the parties. If there has been an agreement
the court will treat it as a business relation. If there is no agree-
ment, the only remedy available is in the law of trusts. These
remedies are, in effect, applied despite the existence of an ostensible
marriage relation. For example, services rendered during the rela-
tionship are not considered as funds for the purposes of a resulting
or constructive trust, nor is there any right in the absence of agree-
ment to compensation for such services. Furthermore, it has been
held that the meretricious relation alone does not give rise to a
71. Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943); Keene v.
Keene, 57 Cal 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962).
72. Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 687, 134 P.2d 761, 764 (1943) (dis-
senting opinion).
73. Id.
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confidential relationship for the purpose of establishing a construc-
tive trust 4
In pointing out that a valid marriage is not always required, the
Carey court in citing Coats v. Coats75 seems to appreciate that it
is the nature of the relationship between the parties that should
govern. Speaking of a putative wife's right to a share in the
accumulated property, that court said:
What she did, she did as a wife, and her share of the joint accum-
ulations must be measured by what a wife would receive out of
community property on the termination of the marriage76
Prior to the Carey case, however, this principle had only been
applied to a spouse who passed the "good faith" test. It had been
denied to other de facto marriages on the basis that "equitable con-
siderations" were not present.7" That the presence or absence of
a ceremony need not necessarily be the conclusive factor in deter-
mining the application of the community property doctrine has long
been recognized. The next question, and the question raised by
the Carey court, is whether the test of "good faith" is any better
a criterion or, for that matter, whether it is even consistent with
the community property rationale.
The concept of community property is based on the theory of
the equality of the spouses. Unlike the common law notion in
which "the husband and wife are one," and that one is the hus-
band,78 the community property rationale recognizes the wife as
being more than just a chattel. She is an equal partner in the joint
enterprise of the marital relation. 9 A study of the history of
community property reveals that this theory is based on economic
factors.
[T]he community system is most frequently found to exist among
the common masses of the people, those who do not own great
worldly possessions, those who must labor from day to day to
maintain themselves and their children, those among whom the
74. See Comment, LEGHTS OF THE PUTATIVE AND B.ERLcIcious SpousE IN
CALvoRa3:p, 50 CAL. L. REv. 866 (1962).
75. 160 Cal. 671,118 P. 441 (1911).
76. Id. at 678 and 444 (emphasis added).
77. Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943).
78. 1 BLAcKsToNB, CovnvmiwrAnms oN THm LAWS OF ENGLAND 430 (1966).
79. HE FuNiAx & VAUGHN, PRINCILEG or CoNn"uN PRoPERTY 2 (2d ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as DE FuNIAx & VAUGHN].
husband and wife work equally together in one capacity or another
S... [T]he United States is primarily of this ... type.80
An analysis of the current economic situation supports this con-
clusion. According to the 1970 Census, 42.2 percent of women over
16 years of age are in the labor force as compared to 77.6 percent
of the men.8 1 Thirty-seven percent of these women have children
under the age of eighteen.8 2 Thus a considerable portion of women
provide a paycheck to their family. Many, in addition, maintain
the traditional mother role. Furthermore, these statistics do not
reflect the "labor" involved in domestic chores, nor do they account
for such intangibles as love, devotion, affection and moral support
that sustain a marital relation.
Do any of these factors change because the parties through
ignorance, lifestyle, or just plain apathy fail to legalize their "mar-
riage" through the prescribed ritual? Manifestly, they do not.
It is true that the community property concept, as it came to us
from Spanish law, was premised upon a marriage ceremony and
that absent this ceremony a party must qualify as a putative spouse
in order to receive a share of the marital acquisitions. But, "[i]n
Spain, of course, the requirements as to a religious ceremony were
due to the influence of the Roman Catholic Church."8' 3 Presumably
this is not the basis for current law focusing on the marriage
ceremony to the exclusion of the marriage relation. What reasons
then can be offered in its support and do they justify the harsh
results that may befall one who violates them?
PRESUMPTIONS
Preliminary to a discussion of the rationale behind the various
requirements of marriage is an appreciation of the significance of
the various presumptions available to one endeavoring to prove a
valid marriage. Even jurisdictions not recognizing common law
marriages provide a measure of protection to de facto marriages
by means of rebuttable presumptions. Premised on the fact that
the law presumes morality and not immorality,8 4 and that the good
faith expectations of the parties should be honored,8 5 the law in
general will presume that the purported marriage is valid and puts
the burden of proof on the party attacking its validity.8 0 In Call-
80. Id. at 21.
81. U.S. DEPT OF COMIERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL SocIAL AND
EcoNoV c CHARAcTERuTIcs-CALF, TABLE 64 (1970).
82. Id.
83. BE Fu.iiA & VAUGHN at 96.
84. Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N.Y. 451 (1883).
85. CLAB: at 67.
86. Id. at 66.
[voL. 12: 436, 1975] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
fornia this general presumption can take several forms: a presump-
tion of a valid marriage from "habit and repute;" a presumption
of a valid marriage from proof of solemnization; and a presump-
tion that the second marriage is valid.
"[I]t has been universally conceded that reputation in the com-
munity is always admissible to evidence the fact of marriage; there
does not seem to have been a time when this was disputed."8 T This
first presumption from "habit and repute" is given statutory recog-
nition in California. The former Civil Code of Procedure expressed
the rule as a presumption,"8 while currently it is stated as an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule.8 9 Proof of habit and repute is generally
stated to require a showing of a common, uniform and undivided
repute to the world.90 This, of course, is no different from the
evidentiary requirements for proof of a common law marriage. In
fact, it has been stated that the statute permits proof of a common
law marriage.91 It has been recognized, however, that in view of
the statutory requirement of license and solemnization, this pre-
sumption is not as strong as it otherwise might be.92
A presumption of a valid marriage is also available upon proof
of solemnization. This strong presumption places a heavy burden
on the party who seeks to attack it. 98 Evidence Code section 663
codifies this common law rule.94
Finally, there is a presumption that a second marriage Is valid.
This is premised upon the assumption that "it would be anomalous
and contrary to common experience to presume that persons
married more than once are bigamists."95  This presumption is
normally limited to situations where one spouse to the first mar-
riage is dead or otherwise absent.96
With the help of these presumptions, the parties to an unlicensed
and unsolemnized "marriage" can prove a "valid marriage" for a
87. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 466 (3d ed. 1940).
88. CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 1963 (20) (West 1955).
89. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1314 (West 1966).
90. In re Estate of Gill, 23 Cal. App. 2d 212, 72 P.2d 771 (1937).
91. Id.
92. Id.; WrnN at 4903.
93. Hamburgh v. Hys, 22 Cal. App. 2d 508, 71 P.2d 301 (1937).
94. CAL. EVID. CODE § 663 (West 1966).
95. In re Estate of Smith, 9 Cal. 3d 74, 80, 507 P.2d 78, 82, 106 Cal. Rptr.
774, 778 (1973).
96. WITKW at 4904.
wide variety of purposes.9 7 It is significant to note, however, that
in all these situations, one party to the purported marriage must
be absent, or if both parties are present, they must both desire a
finding of marriage. If one party is adverse to a finding of a mar-
riage, his or her testimony as to the absence of the requirements
is, of course, admissible and will probably, in the absence of other
circumstances, be enough to rebut the presumption.9" Although
consistent with the rules of evidence, this result ignores the reasons
for creating the presumptions in the first place. There is no less
reason to presume the immorality of one applying for "widow's"
benefits for example, than for one requesting a dissolution. If the
parties originally contemplated that their relationship had all the
incidents of a valid marriage, these good faith expectations should
not be denied merely because the relation is no longer viable. Since
the presumptions protect de facto marriages when neither party
objects perhaps there is an element of punishment or fault involved
in the termination of a meretricious relation.
PREsUMPTIONS OF MAIAGE
The reasons generally espoused for the requirements of a license
and solemnization are the public health, the accuracy of vital
statistics and other records and finally the cautionary effect of these
requirements.99 However, the efficacy of these statutes is seriously
undermined by the lack of effective sanctions for their violation,
the various exceptions provided by the statutes themselves and the
existence of various presumptions which can effectively circumvent
all of the requirements.
The licensing requirement for example has several purposes. Not
only does the record of a license provide objective proof of the
marriage and make for accurate records and statistics, but it also
helps to ensure that the other requirements of marriage have been
fulfilled (age for consent, pre-marital exam, absence of existing
marriage). However, a license is not required at all when two
unmarried persons living together as husband and wife wish to le-
gitimize their relation.100 Furthermore, the ability of the license to
ensure the fulfillment of the other requirements is seriously
hampered by the fact that a defective license or one obtained by
97. See C.nm at 68.
98. People v. Anderson, 26 Cal. 129 (1864); But see Pulos v. Pulos, 140
Cal. App. 2d 913, 295 P.2d 907 (1956) (marriage sufficiently proven despite
husband's testimony that no ceremony had been performed).
99. CrMx at 36.
100. CAL. Crv. CoDE § 4213 (West 1970).
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perjury is nonetheless valid.10 1
Another interest the state seeks to protect by its requirements
for marriage is the public health. A prerequisite to the issuance
of a license is a showing that a test for syphilis is negative for both
parties. 0 2 Again, however, misrepresentation of facts essential to
the enforcement of this requirement does not invalidate the li-
cense.'03 Furthermore, a superior court judge may waive the ex-
amination or permit the license to issue in spite of the existence
of syphilis "if the judge is satisfied. . . that an emergency or other
sufficient cause for such order exists and the public health and
welfare will not be injuriously affected thereby."10 4
Finally, it has been advanced that the various requirements, the
public notice and the formality of solemnization, will have a cau-
tionary effect and thus prevent hasty or ill-advised marriages. It
is submitted that this proposition is far from axiomatic, and that
the ease with which a divorce may be had more than offsets any
efficacy it may once have had. Finally, these requirements induce
caution only with regard to the choice of the marriage site since
when the parties cross the state border to contract their marriage
and then return to California, the marriage is valid notwithstand-
ing that the move was made solely to avoid these statutory
requirements.'05
CONCLUSION
When the Governor and the legislature set about to remedy
California's marital problems, they curiously failed to study the
root of these problems-marriage. Herein lies the problem of
predicating a solution for the problem of the division of property
upon the termination of a void or voidable marriage on the Family
Law Act. This Act concerned itself with divorce and not with the
threshold problem of creating the marriage relation. An examina-
tion of the problem of marriage, however, does reveal a basis for
altering the rules regarding the meretricious-putative spouse dis-
101. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Commission, 204 Cal. App. 2d
805, 23 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1962).
102. CA. Cirv. CODE § 430&r (West 1970).
103. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4308 (West 1970).
104. 1&
105. CAL. CIr. CODE § 4104 (West 1970); WITHIN at 4901.
tinction. First of all, the community property rationale does not
dictate a requirement of a license and solemnization. But even if
it did, a consideration of the laws surrounding the creation and
proof of the existence of a marriage reveals that they do not provide
an adequate rationale for the court's closing its doors to a mere-
tricious spouse. Instead it reveals that in numerous instances, a
strict adherence to the requirements of marriage must yield to what
is considered more important policy considerations. This approach
reflects an appreciation of the fact that:
The one term "marriage" may be used in the law to mean several
different things .... The decisive question becomes, what is the
meaning of "marriage" for purposes of the particular law under
which rights are being claimed? By the same token, in a purely
domestic case, the fact that a person is held "married" for one pur-
pose does not necessarily conclude the issue whether he is "mar-
ried" for some other purpose. 106
The "purposes of the particular law under which the rights are
being claimed" in this case are to ensure that the property accumu-
lated during the marriage relation is divided in a manner consistent
with the partnership nature of the relation. For this purpose, the
definition of marriage provided by the Carey court is sufficient.
However section 4452 of the Family Law Act precludes a statutory
remedy for the meretricious party to such a marriage. Instead, the
court should resort to the same theories that furnished relief to
a putative spouse prior to the Act: the equitable powers of the
court, an analogy to the statute, or a partnership or quasi-partner-
ship theory.
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